Legal Person

California Vehicle Code ?ü 470 articulates that the term ?¨person?Æ includes a natural person as well as various societies, corporations, associations, partnerships, firms and companies. These latter or ?¨artificial persons?Æ are given by the state various legal rights similar to those which natural persons have, such as the right to sue and be sued ?¨as if?Æ they were a single natural person, to own property and real estate.

They are also given some special privileges that are not regularly possessed by natural persons. These include, to name a few, limited liability from suit against individual members, financial support and government grants to assist in relocating their businesses into the state, tax credits, tax deferments, research and development grants. But a corporation or ?¨artificial person?Æ may not even enter any particular state besides its ?¨home?Æ state that gave it a charter allowing it to exist unless it submits to registration and fees from the new state. See Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Fox, 298 U.S. 193 at 197. It may enter such a state if it pays whatever special taxes and registration fees that state requires to allow it to become a resident there. None of these special privileges are natural rights or constitutionally protected rights of natural persons.

This special status of a corporation is specifically noted in the certain state constitutions, such as the Arizona Constitution at Article XIV Section 1; and every state??s statutes. In the U.S.A., due to the Privileges and Immunities clause at Article IV, sec. 2, clause 1 of the Constitution for the United States of America the special fees and restrictions cannot be asserted against a native natural born man or woman who wants to move from one state to another. The right of free ingress and egress from and into all states has existed long before the Constitution was written, so it would be a very serious matter if any officer of California has abolished that right. ?¨[T]he right to travel freely from State to State finds constitutional protection that is quite outside the Fourteenth Amendment?Æ United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 at 760. In some cases a single natural person might choose to take on the status of one of the above ?¨artificial persons?Æ in order to gain access to the special benefits, See Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Bollinger, 485 U.S. 340 at 345 and Moline Properties v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436, but that action does require a waiver of some of the above common law and constitutionally protected rights of a natural man or woman, at least in any matter dealing with the special privileges of artificial persons. This is a down side to such a decision to convert to what is known as ?¨quasi corporate?Æ status, and is the reason it can never be made compulsory. There is much room for doubt as to whether any state may prohibit a natural person from engaging in the ordinary trade or common occupation of transporting things or people for hire unless he pays a revenue tax. He/she may be required to pay a small fee for safety inspections, but no tax to raise general revenue could be imposed as a condition on his/her chosen livelihood (notwithstanding if the person is licensed to engage in a some activity that without such license would be illegal). However, a corporate or quasi corporate ?¨artificial entity?Æ person certainly would be liable.

The statutory construction doctrine of Ejusdem generic must be applied to Vehicle Code ?ü 470 ?¨Person,?Æ for purposes of clarification. Ejusdem generic is defined as:

Rule of Ejusdem generis, which holds that where general words follow enumeration of particular classes of persons or things, general words will be construed as applicable only to persons or things with same general nature or class as those enumerated; applies whether specific words follow general words in a statute or vice versa; in either event, general term or category is restricted to those things that are similar to those which are enumerated specifically. Ex rel. San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development Commission v. Smith, 31 cal.Rptr. 2d 488 (Cal.App. 1st Dist. 1994)

California Vehicle Code ?ü 470, defines the term ?¨person?Æ as:

?¨Person?Æ includes a natural person, firm, copartnership, association, limited liability company, or corporation.

Under the doctrine of Ejusdem generic, the term ?¨natural person?Æ would mean ?¨artificial entity,?Æ because a firm, copartnership, association, limited liability company, or corporation are all undoubtedly artificial persons.

The term ?¨artificial person?Æ is defined in law as:

?¨Persons created and devised by human laws for the purposes of society and government, as distinguished from natural persons. Black??s Law Dictionary, 5th edition, pg. 104.

Common sense and logic alone tells us that human beings are not created and devised by human laws (legislation), for human beings are natural beings. Human beings are created and devised only by Divine law (the laws of the Creator, a/k/a Natural Law). Therefore, human beings (natural persons) are not ?¨artificial persons.?Æ

A natural person cannot be an artificial person coexistently. The terms are not synonymous. The term ?¨artificial person?Æ has been defined already. Let??s now define the term ?¨natural person.?Æ

The term ?¨natural person?Æ is defined in law as:

?¨A human being, as opposed to artificial or fictitious ?¨persons?Æ such as corporations. See 209 F. 749, 754; 104 N.Y.S. 510, 511. The phrase ?¨natural person?Æ does not include corporate entities, but the phrase ?¨person?Æ without qualification may or may not include artificial persons, depending on the context. Thus, the phrase ?¨no person?Æ in the Fourteenth Amendment??s equal protection clause has been held to include natural and artificial persons, see 118 U.S. 394, 396, but the same phrase ?¨no person?? in the Fifth Amendment??s privilege against self-incrimination?Æ clause has been held to include only natural persons and not corporations since the privilege is personal and may not be asserted by an artificial person. See 201 U.S. 43. Business premises are protected from unreasonable searches and seizures and corporations do enjoy Fourth Amendment rights.?Æ See 429 U.S. 338, 353. Barron??s Law Dictionary (Copyright ¬© 1996), 4th edition, pg. 332

A natural person (citizen) has rights protected under the Privileges and Immunities clause of the federal Constitution, whereas an artificial entity does not. An artificial entity is the creation of the State and has a duty to the State, its Creator; unlike the citizen, who is a private individual with no duty to the State, pursuant to Hale v. Hinkel, 201 U.S. 43:

We are of the opinion that there is a clear distinction in this particular between an individual and a corporation, and the latter has no right to refuse to refuse to submit its books and papers for examination on the suite of the State. The individual may stand upon his Constitutional Rights as a Citizen. He is entitled to carry on his private business in his own way. His power to contract is unlimited. He owes no duty to the State or to his neighbors to divulge his business, or to open his doors to investigation, so far as it may tend to incriminate him. He owes no such duty to the State, since he receives nothing therefrom, beyond the protection of his life, liberty, and property. His Rights are such as the law of the land long antecedent to the organization of the State, and can only be taken from him by Due Process of Law, and in accordance with the Constitution. Among his Rights are the refusal to incriminate himself, and the immunity of himself and his property from arrest or seizure except under warrant of law. He owes nothing to the public so long as he does not trespass upon their rights. Upon the other hand, the corporation is a creature of the State. It is presumed to be incorporated for the benefit of the public. It receives certain special privileges and franchises, and holds them subject to the laws of the State and the limitations of its charter. Its rights to act as a corporation are only preserved to it so long as it obeys the laws of its creation. There is a reserved right in the legislature to investigate its contracts and find out whether it has exceeded its power. It would be a strange anomaly to hold that the State, having chartered a corporation to make use of certain franchises, could not in exercise of its sovereignty inquire how these franchises had been employed, and whether they had been abused, and demand the production of corporate books and papers for that purpose. Hale v. Hinkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74-75

The term or phrase ?¨person?Æ is without qualification, meaning it is general, and not specific in nature. When you place another term in front of or behind an already existing term that is general in nature (without qualification), the general term is no longer general, but specific, and now means something totally different in meaning. An example is vehicle and motor vehicle. The term ?¨vehicle?Æ is very basic and general. The term ?¨motor vehicle?Æ is specific, even though most state statutes are very vague in definition on the term ?¨motor vehicle?Æ as contrasted with the federal government. The federal government??s definition for the term ?¨motor vehicle?Æ is not vague like the states because the federal government is not in the business of generating revenue with the use of automobiles, unlike the various states.

The term ?¨person?Æ is without qualification and is in general in nature. The term ?¨natural person?Æ is very specific. Therefore, when used in statutes, the term ?¨person?Æ is a term of art. So why would the code makers put the specific term ?¨natural person?Æ after or behind the general term ?¨person?Æ?
Answer: to willfully confuse and deceive people to think that they are the person referred to in the statute so as to make them believe that the commercial statutes applies to them so that they will voluntarily and without resistant play into the traffic fraud and scheme of the State.

The natural person is a citizen, whereas the artificial person is a resident. A citizen and a resident are not identical or synonymous in nature:
?¨Of course the terms 'resident' and 'citizen' are not synonymous, and in some cases the distinction is important.?Æ? Travis v Yale, 252 U.S. 60; Baldwin v. Franks, 120; U.S. 678, 7 S.Ct. 656, 32 L.Ed. 766

And; further,

?¨Resident.?Æ A resident (Res = ?¨thing?Æ and Ident = ?¨ident-ify?Æ, hence ?¨thing identified?Æ) is a person (natural person, firm, corporation, limited liability association, firm, copartnership, etc.) that resides within a particular location (residence) for commercial purposes and to receive a benefit or privilege (license) from the state (or territory) such as driving, voting, doing business, practicing [law, medicine, etc.], attending a public institution, employment, etc. Residency can be determined or proven by use of a 9 digit federal zoning improvement code (ZIP code) number which designates the residence as an insular possession or territory of the federal United States (Title 4 U.S.C. 105-110). A residence must have an address. Residency is contractual in nature, whereas citizenship is by birthright. Citizen and resident are not synonymous and convertible terms (Prowd v. Gore, (1922) 57 Cal.App. 460). Residency is based upon statutory provision whereas citizenship is based upon constitutional provision. The Privilege of Residency, (1967), by Civil Liberty Publishing Co., page 29. No longer in print.

Residents are commercial entities. This is why, like all corporations or corporate entities, the spelling of their names is in all capital letters. The State willfully prints the name of all corporate entities in all capital letters as a sign and show that the State created it and therefore owns it as its property and can willfully regulate it without regard to constitutional restrictions, unlike in the case with natural person, human being CITIZENS.

If you doubt all capitalization of a name equates to corporate status, well consider the following from the City of Glendale Charter of 1921 (2002 edition):

?¨The City of Glendale, a municipal corporation, shall after the adoption of this Charter, continue its existence as such municipal corporation, and under the corporate name, CITY OF GLENDALE?ñ?Æ emphasis added. City Of Glendale Charter [2002 edition], Article III. Powers of City, Section 1.

This is why the State spells the name of all residents with capital letters.